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BLOCK-RECURSIVENESS OF THE HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION
MODEL UNDER RISK
Raul V. Fabella
It is difficult to exaggeratethe role played by "block-recursiveness"
in recent major studies of farming houeholds (seeLau and Yotopoulos
(I 979) for a summary of some recent works). Indeed, it is hardly pos-
sible nowadays to find an analysis of rural household production rela-
tions with no.explicit reference to this property. Two main currents
have contributed to the widespread popularity of the concept: (a) the
popularity of the household production model which recognizes that
decisions involving production and consumption by farming households
are made in one andthe same spatio-temporal continuum and are thus
intimately related; (b) the extensive use of the duality theory in the
analysis.of the production relations of agricultural enterprises.
In general, the interdependence of the decision blocks (consump-
tion and production) that is inherent in the spirit of the household pro-
duction model renders the duality theory's cost and profit function ap-
proaches less than theoretically appropriate. If households allow con-
sumption concerns to detract them from seeking maximum profit from
their commercial operations, the estimated profit and cost functions
would correspond to decision problems different from those of concern
to the household. The approaches could, however, be used to investi-
.gate whether profit maximizing exists but not whether the household
acts rationally.
Consider a rural farming household with consumption and produc-
tion decisions to make. We call the set of decisions concerning con-
sumption the "consumption block," and the set that has to do with
production the "production block.'"The intersection of the two blocks
may or may not be empty. If the intersection between-the two sets is
nonempty, we call them "dependent"; otherwise they are "indepen-
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dent." If the solution of second(production) block should first bede-
termined (independently of the decisionsin the first block) beforefirst
block solutionsare found, wehavea "block-recursive system." The im-
portant considerationisthat the subsequentfirst block decisionsdo not
feed back into the secondblock to inducean adjustment in the second
block. This absenceof feedback characterizes"block-recursiveness."
The conditions f.or "block-recursiveness" are the concern of this
piper. Sasaki and Maruyama ('1966) and Jorgensonand Lau (1969)
both independently found the existence of a perfectly competitive
labor market that issufficient for the existence of block-recursiveness
in the rural household model under deterministic conditions. Kuroda
and Yotopoulos (1980) considereda householdproduction model with
child labor. If child labor isutilized in adult-specificlproductionactivi-
ties, block-recursivenessno longer obtains. If, however, childlabor is
utilized for child-specific production activities only, block indepen-
dence will hold. This isthe extent of the literature in this area.Surely a
feature so important deservesmoreattention.
Block-Recursivenessin a Simple Household Model: Different Market
Regimes
Consider a rural household with the following welkbehavedtwice
continuously differentiable.utility function.
(1) U= U (c,.X, L T=. Lh)
where
c = the domestic consumption of farm produced commo-
dity, say, rice
X = the market purchased commodity
LT = the total available household time
Lh = the household labor time usedfor home production
LT-.Lh = 1= leisure
The household production function which is assumedstrictly con-
cavetwice continuously differentiable over K and L is:178 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
(2) Q = f(K, L)
where
K = the amount of capital used; we assumeperfect competi-
tion in the capital market
L = the amount of labor used; L = Lh + Lm where Lh is
household and Lm is bought in labor market
The profit definition is:
(3) 7r =pf(K, L) - wL - rK
Note that it is possible for household labor to be sold in the labor mar-
ket, Lrn< 0. The budget constraint in the purchaseof market commodi-
ties isthen
(4) P X = P [f (K, L) - c] - wL - rK
where:
-wL m = cancels out since this amount goes back to the
household
Px = price of X
w = wage of labor
r = price of capital
P = •price of the home-produced farm product
Note that by the way we wrote the production relation, hired labor and
household labor are perfect substitutes. There are no free riding and
motivation problems,thus, there is no extra cost t.ohired labor_ Maximi_
zing equation (1) subject to equation (4) gives the following first-order
conditions:
(i) Uc- XP = 0
0i) Ux-XPx=O
(iii) P (f .- c) - wLm - rK - PxX = 0
(iv) -u, = xPrL: 0
aw
(v) X (PfL - W- L -_ ) =0
(vi) X [ PfK - r ] = 0FABELLA: HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION MODEL 179
where ;k is the Lagrange undetermined multiplier. Note that the con--
sumption decision block ((i), (ii), (iii), (iv))is not independent of the
production block ((v), (vi)). We seefrom (iv) that fL enters the deter-
mination of leisure consumption, and this would thus be affected by
solutions in the production block. Likewise, f,L m and K enter (iii). , ae
Equations (v) and (vi) cannot be solved for optimal L and K* without
regard to the solution of the consumption block. In other words, the
production block is not independent of the consumption block, and the
two blocks must besolved simultaneously for the unknowns.
It is clear from equations (v) and (vi) that the Crucialexpression for
block-recursiveness is the labor market description (dw/dL). (i)•Imper-
fect Labor:• (dw/dL) =/=0.Let the household find L* and K* and satisfy
(v) and (vi). L* implies a certain level of hired labor L*h Which fixes
L* m, L* m _ 0 and L* h _ O. Suppose to start with that L* h = 0. Now
solve (i) - (iv) for (X _, C*, L'h). If L* h = 0 from the consumption
block, then the system is solved. But this coincidence is rare. let Lh
> 0 from the consumption block, i.e., household would want family
labor utilized in production. Then some L_r/ should be bumped off to
accommodate L* h. Then, the influx of hired labor into the market now
lowers the wage rate via (dw/dL) and a new L*, K* hasto be found to
satisfy the new (v) and (vi). This new L*, K* will induce a new f'and
the solutions for (i) - (iv) will now change again and feed back into the
production block. In other words, the two decision blocks have to be
solved simultaneously. There isno block-recursiveness.
(ii) Perfectly Competitive Labor Market: (dw/dL) = 0
Conditions (v) and (vi) will now become
(v') PfL - w = 0
(vi') PfK - r = 0
Let the household find L*, K* satisfying (v') and (vi'). Let us suppose,
without loss of generality, that L*hP = 0. Let (i) t0 (iv) be solved for
(X*, c*, L'h, ). Let L_c > 0 from the consumption block. To accom-
modate Lh*C > O, some Lt_ is bumped off to the market. But (dw/
dL)=O, so the market wage rate is unchanged. The potential feedback
from consumption to production dissipates in the market. Biock-recur-
siveness is the order of the day. Thus, a perfectly competitive market
acts asa sinkhole of feedback via wages.180 , JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
(iii) Institutionally Fixed Wage
The wage rate is now fixed by sociocultural forces (Ranis and Fei
1964) beyond the control of the farmer. Again the condition (dw/dL =
O) holds. It is now the sociocultural environment that acts as the infi-
nite sinkhole and prevents the feedback mechanism from operating. This
third caseis meant to correct the impression given by current literature
that block-recursiveness is possible only under a perfectly competitive
labor market and thus would never obtain where there is surplus labor
and positive wage. In any case,wherever the household is unable to
affect current wagerate, block-recursiveness will prevail.
Riskand the Farming Household
'In the foregoing, we will assumethat either there isperfect compe-
tition in the labor market or there isan institutionally fixed wage.We
will , however, introduce a considerationthat isorganically part of the
farmer's life - risk. The element of risk is doubly important for the
farmer as (a) the nature of the operation exposes the production
processto the vagariesof nature, (b) crop insuranceis either absentor
primitive, and (c) farmers in LDCs are generally too dangerouslyclose
to subsistenceto ignore risk. To make the structure manageablewe
assume that the risk is sufficiently reflected by random variables of
normal distribution. We will considertwo risk regimes:risk in produc-
tion and risk in product price.
A. Block-Recursiveness Under Production Risk
Let f (K, L) mean that production isa randomvariable with a
normal distribution and afinite meanand variance.From equations (1),
(2) and (4), we have
(5) U = U (C,.Pf'(K, L) - wL - rK." Pc, L T_ Lh).
Taking the Taylor seriesexpansion of equation (5) around the meanof
f, f, and taking the expectation of the expansion gives:
(6) EU = U(c, PT(K, L) - wLm - rE ' Pc, L T. Lh) +
Uxx (c,.Pf - wLm - rE- Pc, LT_ Lh) Ox2FABELLA: HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION MODEL •181
the higher moments disappearunder the normality assumption. Note
that
Ox2 = [ E (X)2_ (EX)2] =p2 tE (f)2__ (Ef)2]
There are now still four choice variablesc, Lh, Lm and K. The farmer is




o) u - Uxe+ [Uxx c - Uxxx e]=o
2
02
(ii) - ULT Lh+ UxPf L + 2x [O'xxxPTL _ w) - UxxL T_Lh]
=0 02
(iii) Ux (PT L - w) + _ Uxxx (P_L - w) + -Uxxp2 , 2
[ coy (ffL) ] = 0
02
(iv) Ux (PfK-r) + 2 Uxxx [PTK- r] + Uxxp2
[coy (_fK)] =0
since
082x p22[E(ffh)-E(f)E(fh)]=2p 2 coy (f, fh) Oh
h = L, K. Rewriting (iii), wehave
02
(iii') (P_L-W) [U x +_ Uxxx] 2




Ux +o2 U.x x X
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is a variance-dependent index of risk ayersion. Rewriting (iv) we have
(iv') 1,1' K- r = Rvp2 coy (,';,.rK,
2
Decreasing Absolute Risk and Rv: A Curiosum
We will first focus on this new and rather unfamiliar risk aversion
measureRv.It hasthe following properties:
a) If absolute risk aversion isnonincreasing, i.e.,
aRA/aX _ O, then Rv < RA. This is so since Uxxx > 0 Sothe
denominator of Rv isstrictly greater thanthat of RA.
b) If absolute risk aversion is nonincreasing, then Rv -->O, as
a2 -_ 0o.This is so since Uxxx > O. X
c) If UXXx < 0 with Ux > ax 2 UXXXl, then Rv rises as ax2 be- comes large.
The Arrow assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion(DARA) is
very much a part of the literature on behavior under risk. Unlike his as-
sumption of "increasing relative risk aversion" (IARA), DARA is less
controversial and enjoys a large following. Now the necessarycondition
for DARA is Uxxx > 0. If this is the case, then we have a curious case
where the larger the variance becomes, the more the farmer throws
caution into the wind.
The difference between Rv and RA isthat Rv isalso affected by the
risk structure of the decision problem besidesbeing affected by the uti-
lity structure. It isone viewpoint to say that one's attitude towards risk
is independent of the risk structure. It is not necessarily the only one or
the true one. That one becomes more conservative the greater is the
variability seemsto be a very innocuous observation. Neither the abso-
lute risk aversion index nor the relative risk aversion index displ.aysthis
property. These indices did gain prominence in the wake of interest in
risk but this is not the same as saying that they are wedded to atti-
tudes towards risk. For example, the name "Arrow-Pratt measure of
absolute risk aversion" is used to identify the expression U" fC)/U' (C)
in the solutionFABELLA: HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION MODEL 183
- U" (c) C
u'(c)
to the optimal control problem maximizing the utility of the con-
sumption stream. But no risk is involved in this classof problems. More
properly RA should be called "measure of directional asymmetry.'R v,
on the other hand, is properly a measureof risk aversion.
We can now easily show the following, results:
Proposition1:
If production risk is additive, then, given our assumptions,the
householdproduction model isblock-recursive.
Proof:
let?= +" g e, _is normally distributed with E (_') 0
2 is then The variance ox
2 = p2[E_q+_)2 °x - (E{g +,_})2]
= P' [E(g2,+2g_+'_2) - [(Eg) 2 +2EgE;+ (E_)2]
a_ = p2 [Eg2 _ (Eg)2 + 2g E('_) -- 2g E(;) 2 + E(_)2 -- (E(;)) 2]
= p_[E(_) 2_ (E(_))] _
since g is nonrandom. Differentiating with respect to L we have
_O 2
x = 0 -- coy (f,fL) c3L
Thus (iii _) reduces to
P_ -w= 0
PiK - r = 0184 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
and L* and K* are reached independently of considerations in the
consumption side of the household. Furthermore, since the labor
market is either perfectly competitive or institutionally constrained,
any potential feedback dissipatesin the market, Q.E.D.
Additive randomness is a common assumption in econometrics.
Most linear estimation modelsassumean additive error term. For the
farmer, additive risk comes in the form of vagariesof nature (typhoon,
floods, drought, worm and insect infestation) and man-made disasters
such associal unrest, wars, etc. The farmer hasabsolutely no control
over these chance events. The random Component of production does
not covary with the productivity of the variable inputs.
Proposition2:
If the production risk. is multiplicative of finite variance, then,
under our assumptions,the householdproduction model isnon-block-
recursive.
A
Proof: Let f" = _g(K, L) sothat p_ = peg(K, L)
It isclear that




= p2 _ 2gL _ 0 aL
i}o2
x- = p2 02 e '2gK :/: 0
_K
Thus, the right-hand side of (iii') and (iV') will not be zero with finite
variance and the optimum (L*, K*) will be determined simultaneously
with the consumption variables. Q.E.D.
Multiplicative risk comes in the form of new seed varieties, new
fertilizer packages,new cultivation methods with innovation in general,
and labor disturbance. Productivity may be demonstrably higher but-so
•may risk. Thus, the model has something very specific to say about
farm household conservation: farmers resist innovations not becauseFABELLA:HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION MODEL 185
of the natural risks ordinarily associated with farming; they resist inno-
vations because these are perceived to increase the farming risks.
Proposition 3:
If the farm household exhibits DARA, then the household produc-
tion model becomes more approximately b]ock-recursive as risk in-
creases.
Proof:
It is clear that as ax2 rises Rv falls if Uxx x :> 0 which isa necessary
Condition for DARA. Thus the right-hand side of (iii_) and (ivr) will
approach zero as ax2 rises indefinitely. Q.E.D.
This is the curious result when DARA is assumed. This can be un-
derstood in this way. As variability rises indefinitely, the capacity of
the farmer to affect the risk diminishes so that beyond a certain point
he could not care less. Thus, the crucial link here is the farmer's belief
in his capacity to devise a homemade insurance in the form of conser-
vation in the use of inputs. If he believes that very little can be done
in this area, he will seek insurance somewhere else (viz., extended
family system, share tenancy arrangements, etc.).
B. Block-Recursiveness Under Price Risk
We now consider the situation when price is a random variable.
Now price uncertainty is also an issue of great importance to farmers.
We know that price covaries with aggregate production and that price
support schemes are designed partly to alleviate problems arising from
this covariation. There are other risks which are unrelated to this cova-
riation. Demand may be disrupted due to wars, technical innovation,
natural calamities (such as the disruption of the anchovy cycle due to
the disappearance of pyroplanktons in certain waters off Central Ame-
rica). In the following, we will be dealing more with price uncertainty
generated from the demand side.
Let P be the random price realized by the farmer from the sale of a
unit of farm produce. The equation corresponding to equation (1) is
(7) U=UCC,?(f-c)-wL m-rK, LT-Lh186 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Corresponding to (6) we have
(8) ,E(U) = U (c, Pf(K, L)'- wL m - rk -Pc, LT- L')
4- Cx x u 2
x
2
where Ox2 = (f (K, L) - c): [E(P 2)-(EP) =' 1
= (f - c)= 02
P
Corresponding to (iii') and (iv') are
Rv(f - c)f L 0=
(v) PfL -- W = p
2
(vi) PfL - r = Rv
2
since _ 2 is assumedto be independent of levels of L and K used by the
farmer p
Proposition 4:
Under price uncertainty, block-recursiveness obtains for the house-
hold production model if either:
(a) f= c, i.e., the production ofx isfor subsistence consumption
(b) the household exhibits DARA and ox2-_
Proof:
Obvious from the right-hand side of (v) and (vi) Q.E.D.
It is clear that these situatiors are not very interesting. In case(a) price
variability is not relevant. Price uncertainty in every form translates
into multiplicative risk for production, so that the interesting cases
wash out. Let_ p6 _" = e. Then pq =p°g +'_g which is multiplicative in
production. Let _ = e_p °, then,pg =pO'_g, which isagain multiplicative
in production.FABELLA; HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION MODEL 187
Block-Recursiveness and Profit Maximization: An Empirical Consider-
ation
We have clearly shown that the conditions for block-recursiveness
are identical to the conditions for profit maximization. This means that
the test for profit maximization is also a test for block-recursiveness if
we assume tha_t farming under any circumstance is a risky business. This
tieup is significant because, in effect, the model generates hypotheses
about risk behavior, the empirical tests of which have been already
done extensively by many different authors in many different coun-
tries. Specifically, if farmers are seen to maximize profit with respect to
variable inputs, then farming risks are perceived to be additive risks and
not multiplicative ones.
Lau and Yotopoulos (1979), summarizing six studies on agricultural
resource allocation, observed that at 0.01 level of significance the hy-
pothesis of profit maximization for farmers from Taiwan, japan, Malay-
sia, Thailand and Turkey cannot be rejected. Barnum and Squires's
(1980) well-known analysis of Muda paddy agriculture also fails to re-
ject profit maximization. Ali (1980) also finds that profit maximization
cannot be rejected for Misamis Oriental farmers. Thus, it appears that
farming risks are perceived to be additive. Farmers, then, do not feel
that they can fashion a homemade insurance scheme by being conserva-
tive on the variable inputs.
Homogeneity and Additive Risk
The presence of additive risk constrains the type of production
functions possible. It is clear that the most important class of production
functions that cannot allow additive risk is the class of homogeneous
functions. Let
f = q(K, L) + e
where g is homogeneous of degree r and _" is the random term: f itself
fails to be homogeneous of any degree. This is problematic since the
Duality theorems (Diewart 1974) assume constant returns to scale
(homogeneity of degree 1) in the original production functions. If risks
are perceived to be additive, the original production functions will have
interceRts and would then be inhomogeneous. Likewise, the Duality
theorem for production assumes profit, to be maximized. If .risks are188 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
not additive, profit maximization is not possible unless farmers are risk
neutral. But the latter is rejected by Binswanger (1980) in his study of
Indian farmers although the experimental setting may not have been
realistic. He finds that decreasing absolute risk aversion is the prevailing
attitude. The relation between additive risk and homogeneous product-
ion function needs to be investigated more closely.
Summary
In the foregoing, we have highlighted the following about the
household production model under risk:
(a) Additive production risk allows the household production
model to be block-recursive (Prop. 1); multiplicative risk does
not (Prop. 2);
(b) Price uncertainty stemming from demand conditions does not
allow interesting block-recursive cases. This is because price risk
translates into multiplicative risk in production;
(c) For all types of uncertainties, a decreasing absolute risk aversion
effects approximate block-recursiveness as a2 _ oo x




Ux + x Uxx x 2
and compared its properties to the index of absolute risk aver-
sion of Arrow and Pratt.
On the whole, we conclude that farm households will be conserva-
tive with respect to input use when they can devise a homemade in-
surance through input use.
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